the evolving mind

The caption to one of my favorite New Yorker cartoons reads, “There are two kinds of people in this world: Those who believe there are two kinds of people, and those who don’t.”

Critical thinkers frequently use the term rational. We value rationality. We refer to some types of thought and behavior as rational, others as irrational. But are those the only options? Is a person either rational or irrational? This too, is an impossibly simplistic dichotomy.

I try to view human behavior and thought as more rational and less rational. What can make a person more or less rational? The root of the word, ratio, connotes measurement and comparison. Four elements that might influence the degree to which we are rational come to mind: 1) the quantity of information used, 2) the quality of information, 3) whether or not the selection of information is biased, and 4) whether or not the information is apportioned a proper weight, as some types of information are more reliable than others.

In a 4-part series of posts I aim to explain how human beings, perhaps by nature, tend to be biased in their selection of information, and how this can perpetuate phony knowledge.

If you are not familiar with the concept of the confirmation bias, you should be. It is perhaps the most common impediment to rationality that thinkers face. Put briefly, the confirmation bias consists of the tendency to notice information than confirms your beliefs while neglecting information that challenges them.

However tersely put, the confirmation bias is not a neatly circumscribed problem. We are all afflicted. In fact, it may be natural for us to be so. That is why it is an extremely common impediment to more rational thought.

Naturally biased? If a belief consists of a neural network, an analogy can be drawn between beliefs and butterfly nets. When holding a belief-net, we are capable of catching those flitting bits of data that fit the net. But here’s the rub: How are we to catch relevant bits of data that don’t fit?

Consider the patently silly ditty about blondes having more fun. (Admittedly, the silliness is my presumption; I have sought no serious information on the matter.) Equipped with this belief-net, any observation of a blonde behaving in a manner that could be classified as fun would then be caught and excite the mind in recognition. “Aha, just like I thought. Blondes do have more fun.” Yet, lacking suitable nets, how is the same mind to catch opposing or alternative cases? What is going to cause the mind to light up when observing a blonde not having fun
(an opposing case) or a red-head having a good time or a brunette having an outright blast (alternative cases)?

By their very nature, beliefs are self-perpetuating. Even bogus ones. To illustrate I will examine three common notions about human behavior that are not the diamonds of wisdom they are accepted as, but rather rhinestones of folklore. Stay tuned.

Technorati Links: belief, critical thinking, skepticism

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